Market Makers\u27 Methods of Stock Manipulation: How Trading Manipulations Can Adversely Affect a Firm\u27s Equities and What Finance Managers Can Do About It by Cataldo, Anthony J., II & Killough, Larry N.
West Chester University
Digital Commons @ West Chester University
Accounting Faculty Publications Accounting
Summer 2003
Market Makers' Methods of Stock Manipulation:
How Trading Manipulations Can Adversely Affect
a Firm's Equities and What Finance Managers Can
Do About It
Anthony J. Cataldo II
West Chester University of Pennsylvania, acataldo@wcupa.edu
Larry N. Killough
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcupa.edu/acc_facpub
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Accounting at Digital Commons @ West Chester University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Accounting Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ West Chester University. For more information,
please contact wcressler@wcupa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cataldo, A. J., & Killough, L. N. (2003). Market Makers' Methods of Stock Manipulation: How Trading Manipulations Can Adversely
Affect a Firm's Equities and What Finance Managers Can Do About It. Management Accounting Quarterly, 4(4), 10-13. Retrieved from
http://digitalcommons.wcupa.edu/acc_facpub/4
10M A N A G E M E N T  A C C O U N T I N G  Q U A R T E R L Y S U M M E R  2 0 0 3 ,  V O L . 4 ,  N O . 4
I
f you are involved in the decision to finance assets
with debt or equity and your company’s shares are
publicly traded or may be, you should watch for
and guard against exposure to broker-dealer or
market maker manipulation (MMM). In this arti-
cle, we offer you a primer on MMM, “naked shorting,”
and Internet-based sources of additional information.1
By increasing your awareness of market maker manipu-
lation, you may be able to (1) better recognize and
defeat the adverse effects of MMM on your firm’s equi-
ty securities, (2) dramatically reduce the risks associated
with your firm’s failure to maintain market-based debt
covenant ratios with lenders, and (3) avoid the need to
recapitalize with additional equity issues at a manipulat-
ed or artificially low price per share.
THE MARKET MAKER
A market maker, who handles small-sized and micro-
cap stocks; an exchange floor specialist, who is involved
with mid-sized or large-capitalized stocks; or a broker-
dealer, who handles all stocks, performs two separate
and, apparently, incompatible functions.
First, all maintain an inventory of the stocks their
firms have underwritten, continue to trade, or make a
market in. They buy and sell these inventories for prof-
it. In theory, they will buy low, which reduces the
decline in price per share (PPS), and sell high, which
reduces the rise in PPS. Therefore, these profit-making
behaviors are presumed to provide a stabilizing effect
on changes in the PPS of the stocks they make a
market in.
Second, they post the bid and ask prices at which
others are willing to buy or sell and match incoming
buy and sell orders. In return for performing these func-
tions, market makers or specialists generate revenue for
their firm through various order-flow or transaction-fee
schemes.
But like the conflicts apparent in the dual role of an
analyst-broker or auditor-consultant, the broker-dealer is
faced with an opportunity to sell his or her firm’s inven-
tory before others in a declining market or buy for his or
her firm’s inventory before others in a rising market.
This practice is one form of market maker manipula-
tion. It is illegal, difficult to detect, but alleged in many
instances—both correctly and, often, incorrectly—on
Internet stock-chat message boards. One relatively
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highly publicized example of MMM is referred to as
front running.
FRONT RUNNING
In front running, specialist market makers use their
knowledge of private, incoming order-flow information
revealed by limit orders to generate monopolistic trad-
ing profits. Though front running per se may not be
particularly damaging to your firm, it illustrates the
abuse of the conflicting roles of the broker-dealer as
both a facilitator of an orderly market (matching incom-
ing orders from other investors to buy and sell) and as
someone with the desire to generate profits from the
inventories traded for their firm’s account.2
On June 4, 2002, The Wall Street Journal reported that
Knight Trading Group, which handled more than 11%
of all the buy and sell orders for Nasdaq-listed stocks in
2000, was under investigation by the Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) for alleged front run-
ning. Knight’s former head of institutional trading
accused Knight traders of front running. He alleged that
the traders placed their own orders for stock before
placing the same orders for Knight’s customers, profit-
ing in advance from customer orders they knew would
push the stock of a company up or down, costing
investors millions of dollars. The day the Journal story
was published, Knight’s chief executive issued a state-
ment denying the allegations. In November 2002,
Knight announced that the SEC began formally investi-
gating the front-running charges. The investigation has
not yet been concluded.
Another type of market manipulation is the naked
short sale. Firms with a declining PPS are targeted for
naked short selling. This practice is very damaging to the
publicly traded firm and may be popular among the off-
shore brokerage firms where U.S. securities laws are less
easily enforced or do not apply. It is similar to the coun-
terfeiting of currencies. In a naked short sale of stock,
short positions are not declared or disclosed, shares are
not borrowed to cover the short sale, and the stock is
never delivered to the purchaser. The result is dilutive in
that it results in an artificial, unauthorized, and illegal
increase in the number of shares issued and outstanding
and in a manipulated decline in the PPS of the firm’s
stock. The broker-dealer merely floods the market with
cheap, nonexistent shares of your firm’s stock. The seller
of these nonexistent shares keeps the proceeds.3
For example, on August 13, 2002, GeneMax Corp.
announced concerns over naked shorting and took mea-
sures to ensure that trading in their shares occurred in a
“fair and appropriate manner.”4 Records indicated that
as of August 2, 2002, shareholders of record held
400,820 shares, where only 265,654 were available, free-
trading shares, leaving the Depository Trust Corpora-
tion and Canadian Depository for Securities Limited
with a net deficiency of more than 168,000 shares.
On August 16, 2002, a two-year federal sting led to
the indictment of 58 stock brokers and corporate execu-
tives. The unsealed indictment alleged stock manipula-
tion of JagNotes.com, Softsquad Software Ltd., and C
Me Run Corp. On January 23, 2003, Jag Media Hold-
ings, Inc., the parent company of JagNotes.com,
announced that it would allow “custody only” trading
of its stock to protect stockholders against naked short
selling. Under custody-only trading, a company’s stock
is issued only in the name of beneficial owners in physi-
cal certificate form.
Even the once large-capitalization, business-to-busi-
ness firm PurchasePro.com, in an open letter from the
CEO, suggested that shareholders move their holdings
to cash accounts or request delivery of their share cer-
tificates to prevent the shares from being legitimately
shorted.
STOCK-CHAT MESSAGE BOARDS
We recommend that publicly traded firms, particularly
small-caps and micro-caps, monitor the Yahoo! Finance
and Raging Bull stock-chat message boards. This addi-
tional task doesn’t need to be onerous but requires
some understanding or review of the history and sophis-
tication of the person who is posting the message. For
example, an unsophisticated investor attempting to pur-
chase 5,000 shares of your firm’s stock may receive what
is referred to as an automatic execution or a partial fill
of a larger limit-price day order for 100 or 200 shares.5
Here, for example, is one message:
OT: I can’t believe that someone bought $2 worth of
stock (100 shares) and paid a minimum $8 dollar (sic)
commission.6
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This unsophisticated investor failed to understand
that an automatic execution caused the transaction for
100 shares of a stock selling at two cents per share. This
was a partial fill from a larger order but was misinter-
preted as a completed trade. These transactions are
often blamed on MMM but result only from a buyer’s
failure to place an all-or-none order.
Another message is about a large spread between the
best bid and lower bids:
Some unfortunate traders were thought (sic) a sorry
lesson today using stops. Use stops on IWAV and you
will be taken out.
This sophisticated investor is referring to stop loss
market orders for the stock of Interwave Communica-
tions International, suggesting that the market maker
was able to sell a few shares (even to himself or herself)
to reach or activate the stop loss orders, buy a large
quantity of cheap shares, and allow the PPS to rise
quickly, rebounding to the appropriate market value per
share. These trades are very profitable for the market
maker but could also have been made by sophisticated
individual investors who use the Nasdaq Level II quote
system (L2).7 L2 provides additional information to
those buying or selling a security, including the depth
of bid-ask spreads, by broker-dealer.
Repeated complaints of these types of trades on the
stock-chat message boards may suggest that the issuer
do a preliminary investigation into the day’s trading log
and MMM.8 One form of market maker manipulation
may be a predictor of future, more damaging cases of
MMM. In any case, high frequencies of trading com-
plaints may lead new or potential investors to avoid
investments in your firm’s stock.
We recommend you develop a checklist summary
that you periodically review. Table 1 provides a simple
example of the format you may want to use to monitor
people on stock-chat message boards. You can modify
this format as your experiences require.
DETECTION METHODOLOGY
The simplest way to detect MMM in your company’s
stock is to have one or more of your administrative per-
sonnel monitor the stock-chat message boards for com-
ments or complaints about trading of it. Only unusual
commentary or atypical stock price or volume activity
would be cause to investigate further.
We recommend monitoring trading in your compa-
ny’s stock on L2 when posting activity increases, stock
price or volume behavior is atypical, or a large number
of complaints are detected on the stock-chat message
boards. The level of sophistication can often be deter-
mined by reviewing the aliases’ posting history, a fea-
ture available on both Raging Bull and Yahoo! Finance
stock-chat message boards.
Finally, you should not respond directly to stock-chat
message-board complaints because, as a company insid-
er, you may violate the SEC’s Regulation FD (Fair
Disclosure). ■
The research leading to the development of this article was
partially supported by a 2002 Oakland University School of
Business Administration research grant.
The material for this article comes from a forthcoming
monograph, Information Asymmetry: A Unifying Con-
cept for Financial & Managerial Accounting Theories
(Including Illustrative Case Studies), to be published by
Elsevier Science.
Table 1: Stock-Chat Message Board Summary Worksheet
Message Board Message Number Date Time Author or Alias Issue or Content Our Comments
Raging Bull 94231 4/12/2002 11:17 a.m. Aim4theFence Small Trade Auto Execution.
Unsophisticated.
Yahoo! Finance 19751 8/1/2002 6:23 p.m. wall street guy Stop Losses Market maker
takes out stops.
Sophisticated.
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1 For example, see: http://www.nakedshortselling.com/. 
An example of an NASD Regulation complaint, hearing 
details, and their findings of fact may be found at 
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/nac0599—02.txt.
2 Individual investors discuss these behaviors on stock-chat mes-
sage boards. Even when the period of front running is brief, it
rarely goes unnoticed. Individual investors post messages about
their own trades and the failures of market makers to honor
their trades in the legally required sequence. In fact, one of the
authors has had personal experiences with this behavior, which
was later corrected after complaints were filed with myTrack, an
online broker. In that case, market makers refused to honor the
trade, which was in the money at the time of the complaint. But
myTrack resolved the matter prior to the close of the trading
day.
3 This and other trading manipulations are governed by restric-
tions enforced by the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange, and
the NASD. For example, short sales cannot be executed in a
declining market, and manipulation is specifically prohibited.
See SEC rules 10a-1 (the uptick rule) and 10a-2 (the availability/
delivery rule), NASD rule 3350 (the best bid rule), and Rule 105
of Regulation M.
4 For GeneMax’s announcement and its discussion about naked
shorting of its shares and a tabular accounting of them, see 
http://www.genemax.com/pdf/genemax—pr—08-13-02.PDF.
5 An automatic execution is a trade for 100 or 200 shares—a par-
tial fill of a larger order—regardless of the size of the order
above 200 shares. For example, a 5,000-share buy order may
have had 100 shares filled immediately. The remaining 4,900
shares of the order may or may not have ever been filled or the
original order completed. The broker will advise customers that
the automatic execution is designed to increase or broaden par-
ticipation in a firm’s stock. An alternative or less positive view is
that it maximizes broker commissions and order flow, particular-
ly in cases of low-priced or penny stocks.
6 OT is an abbreviation for “off-topic,” used, for example, to sug-
gest or provide tips or insights on other stocks.
7 Market makers are often blamed for these trades because they
are presumed to have access to the execution price of stop loss
orders. Some explanatory materials about L2 are located at
http://daytrading.about.com/library/weekly/aa061900a.htm?
PM=ss13—daytrading.
8 For example, myTrack, an online broker, provides a detailed
transaction log for the prior and current trading day. For an addi-
tional monthly fee, the market maker, through which the trades
were executed on L2, can be identified in real time. Other
online brokers may also provide this free service, and the
issuer’s investor relations department may make inquiries with
their exchange or transfer agent.
